Annexure III

During the early part of 1942, the Resistance groups in Holland had been instructed by London to refrain from any act of sabotage which might draw the attention of the Germans to the existence of an organisation in Holland. Only 'sabotage insaissisable' was to be carried out. At this time, therefore, no such actions were required on the part of III-F.

Some time in July 1942, however, CATARRH (Taconis), through EBENEZER (Louwers), was asked for the fullest possible information about the WT station Kootwijk and was instructed to make plans for its destruction at a date to be notified. Shortly afterwards, this date was notified from London in a complicated code message which, however, was broken by
B-Stelle.

As London appeared to attach considerable importance to the secrecy of this date, the Germans deduced that, on the day mentioned, operations of some importance would take place and special precautions were taken by the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Holland and the SD, but nothing eventuated. It was then arranged, however, to stage an attack on the wireless station and it was proposed that a mock battle should take place with troops and 'thunder flashes' in order to evoke amongst the civilian population the impression that an attack had really taken place, in view of the fact that it was feared that London might be independently controlling the existence of this attack. However, the staging of the mock battle was turned down on security grounds, as it was desired to keep the circle of people aware of the double-play as small as possible. It was, however, reported to London that the attack had failed as the groups had unexpectedly come upon anti-personnel mines and had incurred certain losses. The next day a notice from the Wehrmachtsbefehlhaber, Holland, appeared in all the Dutch newspapers reporting an attack by criminal elements on the wireless station, which however, thanks to the watchfulness of the guards and the exellence of the security measures, had been frustated and that on account of the active assistance rendered by sections of the Dutch population during the defeat of the attack, General CHRISTIANSEN would refrain from taking hostages.

After this attack, it was decided to mount a 'succesfull'operation. A old bulk of about 1000 tons was produced through Referat III-M and loaded with wrecks of old and damaged aeroplanes. The 'planes' were painted up and covered with tarpaulins so that from a distance it was impossible to recognis their true nature. A charge was loaded in the hold of the ship by a certain Leutnant KLINGENBERG of AST-Belgien and Uffz. BODENS, who at that time was with Abt. II, AST-Belgien, but was loaned for the occasion. It was arranged so that the charge could ne initiated from the deck of the bulk A naval tug was ordered to take the ship from Amsterdam to Dordrecht via Rotterdam. Apart from KLINGENBERG and BODENS and two sailors on board the ship, no one knew what had been planned.

When one morning the tug and its tow were in the vicinity of the Maas birdges in Rotterdam, tha charge was ignited and the ship began to sink. The tug cut its tow and tried to push the damaged ship towards the shore, whereby an other ship was rammed and badly damaged. The ship with the 'planes' on board sank amidst cries of jubilation from the hundreds of Dutch people on the banks who believed it was an act of sabotage by the Resistance organisations. KLINGENBERG and BODENSwere actually arrested by the captain of the tug who suspected them of being saboteurs.

From then onwards, from time to time, railway demolitions were carried out by Uffz. BODENS who in most cases took care to leave at the scene some of the incident material obviously of British origin. The purpose of these demolitions was to create amongst the Dutch railway employees the idea that a Britisk controlled sabotage organisation was actively operating. Later however, III-F were forced to stop these acts of sabotage as the SD had decided to take hostages when any act of sabotage had taken place and it would have been noticed if in such cases hostages were not made.

In addition, it had become clear to GISKES that there was no sister-organisation in Holland controlled from London which was supervising such activities independently.

From then omwards, all acts of sabotage which took place in Holland and which were undertaken by small indigenous groups with home-made materials, were attributedto the London organisation and SOE was notified of them. On one occasion a munition train from Belgium, consiting of 25 trucks was probably sabotaged by an unknown Belgian group, but in any case a report of the incident was passed to London as being the act of one of the SOE organisers. In addition sabotage in de dockyards and factories was freely invented and passed to London, and London expressed considerable satisfaction with the results obtained.

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