Annexure IX

Q.1.
What are the details of the initial penetration by JOHHNY which enabled the Germans to shadow CATARRH (Taconis) and to supply him with false Ia information, e.g. the location of the German cruiser, "Prinz Eugen"; who was JOHHNY and over what period was the penetration maintained?

A.1.
The name JOHHNY is unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. It is known, hoever, that CATARRH (Taconis) was constantly associating with the Dutch Capatain of the Reserve, VAN DEN BERG, who had important connections with the port authorities in Rotterdam. It is possible, therefore, that VAN DEN BERG passed this information to CATARRH who in turn passed it to EBENEZER (Lauwers) for onwards transmission. Both GISKES and HUNTEMANN deny that false information of an Ia character was ever passed to VAN DEN BERG. RIDDERHOF first made contact with VAN DEN BERG in December 1941. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN know, RIDDERHOF did not use the name JOHHNY. RIDDERHOF was handled by Uffz. KUP. Is it possible that this Johhny was in fact Johhny den Droog?

Q.2.
What are the details of the liaison between the ASTS France, Belgium and Holland? What exchange of information existed for the briefing of interrogators of captured agents?

A.2.
Initial interrogation by SCHREIEDER and when necessary, by GISKES, took place at SD HQ at The Hague. Subsequently interrogation on codes was carried out by Uffz. MEY (May) at Haaren prison. MEY was purely a code and cypher expert. Berlin, 1942, directed that a regular exchange of data, based on information received from the interrogations of captured agents, should take place between ASTS Holland, France and Belgium. In addition each AST sent an individual report on each interrogation to III-F-Berlin. Reports consisted of about one page of foolscap giving the following information:
a. Name and cover name.
b. Controlling organisation of the agent.
c. Mission.
d. Short summary of training.
e. Precis of the interrogation.

As far as is known to GISKES there was no similar interchange of information between the various SD Stellen.

III-F-Berlin issued, about every three months, a summary of British intelligence activities in other countries e.g. Middle-East, North-Africa, Crete, Scandinavia, etc.

Technical WT interrogations were carried out by the Funkabwehr who reported to their main office in Berlin; when the Funkabwehr was withdrawn from Holland, these interrogation were conducted by the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who also reported the results to their main office. Abtg. Funkabwehr, berlin, issued a monthly cicular which incorporated the information obtained from these two sources.

Information on new sabotage devices was forwarded to Abtg, II-Berlin by the relevant Abtg.II-Stelle in the countries concerned. Any matters of special interest interest were incorporated in the 3-monthly III-F-Berlin summaries.

MEY, at the beginning of 1942, had no knowledge of SOE background and was compelled build this up from his own interrogations. It is possible, however, that he may have received the results of interrogation of agents captured in other countries, through Sipo channels.

Q.3.
What were the details of the notional capture and death of MARROW (Jambroes) and his WT Operator (Bukkens)?

A.3.
III-F "captured and killed" MARROW and his WT operator on 19-11-1942 (message No.1 from CUCUMBER (Dane) via TRUMPET (Jordaan) refers).

The Germans thought that the absence of casualties might cause suspicion in London and, as they were under the impression that London might be intending to exfiltrate MARROW, he and his operator were selected for notional extermination.

Q.4.
The reason for the sudden cessation of the SPINACH (Buizer) messages?

A.4.
EBENEZER (Lauwers), in his signal Nr.3 of 7-4-1943, suspended BONI (Buizer) traffic mentioning suspected treason in 'VICTORY' circles. Koos VORRINK had been arrested shortly before this date and the Germans thought that news of this arrest would be bound to reach the UK; as SPINACH (Buizer) had been carrying this traffic they deemed it advisable to shut him down.

Q.5.
What did the Germans know of CARROT (Dessing)?

A.5.
On 15-5-1942, London in CXG-17, told TRUMPET (Jordaan) to make a rendezvous with CARROT. The address of this rendezvous was sent in a complicated code which was broken by the Germans. The address of the rendezvous was Bodega "Leidsche Poort", Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam. At this time ofcourse, TRUMPET was under control, as was TURNIP
(Andringa). For some reason unknown to GISKES or HUNTEMANN the Sipo, who handled this affair, decided that TURNIP should keep the appointment. The latter, however, was able to warn CARROT, that his two companions were plain-clothes police, and he was able to escape through a lavatory.

Prior to the receipt of the message quoted above, the Germans had no knowledge of CARROT' s existence, nor did they succeed in arresting him after his escape.

Q.6.
The two Anton DE WILDES?

A.6.
a) Anton DE WILDE @ ADRIAN was the name employed by Uffz. BODENS of III-F Ast-Niederlande for his notional exfiltration to the UK in May 1943. He was passed through to Paris by ARNO (see A.7 & 8), where he was 'arrested'in a Cafe in the Bvd. des Capucines, whilst in the company of the genuine Britsh agent MARCEL (Jack Charles Stanmore Agazarian). The latter, however, was unmolested (Agazarian was caught during his second mission and executed at Flossenberg).

b) VAN DER WAALS @ DE WILDE @ ANTON was Hauptmann of Krim.Rat. SCHREIEDER of the SD, The Hague.

This man was responsible for the penetration of the Koos VORRINK group. In a message from London to BONI, Nr.34 of 12-11-1942, orders were given to contact a certain VENUS (van Looi), the latter was a member of the Koos VORRINK Group and VAN DER WAALS, after making this contact, was able to penetrate this organisation. In order to inspire confidence VAN DER WAALS asked that a BBC message should be broadcast and this was done. This confidence having been obtained, Koos VORRINK sent the 'VICTORY' messages through VAN DER WAALS and these were transmitted on the BONI line.

It is pointed out that this affair - the group being indigenous - was handled by SCHREIEDER, and III-F merely loaned the BONI link for this purpose.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, back lists, distributed by one of the Dutch Resistance Groups, descibed VAN DER WAALS as being a notorius SD agent.

HUNTEMANN also declares that VAN DER WAALS was taken by Captain ABEN (Groep Zwaantje)(Camp 020 case) to see the British Military Attache in Stockholm. He is unable to give the date and this information is second-hand from SCHREIEDER.

In September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that "VAN DER WAALS in England sei und freiwillig herüber gegangen sei". HUNTEMANN had the impression that SCHREIEDER was considerably worried at this news. He also recollects that, possibly in 1943 VAN DER WAALS was notionally murdered by the SD as he was 'blown' throughout Holland.

Q.7.
Whether the BROADBEAN/GOLF (van Os/W. v.d. Wilden) escape line fitted into the general scheme of the Abwehr and what were the dividends they received from?

A.7.
These two agents arrived in Holland on 2-2-1943 and were duly arrested on landing. Interrogation established that their mission was to organise escape lines for ex-infiltrees, etc. For this purpose they had been provided with blank French and Belgian identity cards and a large sum of French and Belgian money. Technical running of an escape line presented difficulties to the Germans, since had they given the impression to London that the lines were working satisfactorily, there would have been no excuse for making difficulties over the exfiltrations for which London was constantly asking. In addition, a series of notional arrests on these lines would also have appeared suspicious. The policy therefore was to minimise as far as possible, the potentialities of the BROADBEAN/GOLF lines.

The only dividends according to the Germans were the addressesof safe houses and contacts sent by London, over the BROADBEAN/GOLF link. As for example the information provided in Nr.2 to BROADBEAN/GOLF dated 28-4-1943 giving the address of a safe house and a password. It was found that the contacts given were, in most cases, of minor importance and no arrests, as far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN know, resulted from this traffic, the policy being merely to keep obersavation and not to 'blow' the addresses or contacts. An exception to this was a house search, at the address where MARCEL lived in Paris, believed to be in the Place Clingnancourt, as it was thought that, in view of ADRIAN's 'arrest' no action would have appeared suspicious.

At a later date, which neither can remember, ARNAUD @ ARNO, i.e. Uffz. CHRISTMANN (Richard Christmann), was sent to Paris to an address notified from London with a story that other exflitrees were to be expected shortly. On arrival, however, it appeared that London had asked for the exfiltration of ARNO and the latter, willingly, was sent along the line accompanied by a woman as far as Lyons. Here he came under suspicion, but managed to talk his way out of it and returned to Holland, where he reported the address of the house in Lyons and the place was watched, but appenently the organisers of the line had realised the implication of ARNO's visit and nothing eventuated.

All addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London on the BROADBEAN/GOLF link were passed to the relevant Asts, but the results obtained were generally unknown to III-F Holland.

Q.8.
What was the true identity of the passeur ARNO or ARNAUD?

A.8.
Uffz. CHRISTMANN III-F, Ast Niederlande.

Q.9.
Details of the activities of Col. KOPPERT?

A.9.
Col. KOPPERT (Overste Leonardus Arnoldus Marie Koppert 1885-1990) was a man who had good connections with a few senior German officers, names unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN.

It appears that RIDDERHOF met KOPPERS by chance in a train and commenced talking about resistance activities. It seems, however, that KOPPERT mistrusted RIDDERHOF but put him in touch with Sgt. KNOPPERS. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF only met KNOPPERS on a few occasions and was unable to produce anything of an incriminating or interesting character

Q.10.
Adminstrative arrangements under which RIDDERHOF worked for Abwehr in both Holland and Belgium?

A.10.
In the autumn of 1941, Uffz. KUP had come into contact with RIDDERHOF after the latter's release from prison. In December 1941 RIDDERHOF was receiving from III-F a fixed salary of 200 guilders which by 1942 had rissen to 300 guilders permonth, and at the end of that same year, 500 guilders. By the summer of 1943 RIDDERHOF had become completely 'blown' in Holland and left for Brussels, with the idea, so GISKES and HUNTEMANN state, of withdrawing from all GIS activities. Nevertheless he still drew his monthly salary from AST-Niederlande. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF was never piad by AST-Brussels but, naturally, was known there and he could rely on the AST's help for procuring identity papers, passports and living quarters, etc.

His various addresses, as known to III-F-Niederlande were as follows:
a. Blaricum, Holland, near Hilversum, Korte Moolenweg 2. Frequently used and relatives of his (by marriage) lived
there.
b. There was another address, obtained from the local police in Arnhem. He was probably registrated here under the
name RIDDERHOF.
c. Rue de Throne, Brussels (Nr. forgotten).
d. In the spring of 1943 lived for a time in various hotels in Spa.

Q.11.
Details of the two NORDPOL agents, alleged to be a British captain and a Dutchman, brought from Holland to Belgium in the summer of 1944. The two agents are said to have agreed to co-operated with the Germans, but only against the Russians.

A.11.
The two agents were EBENEZER (Lauwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan). Details are given in statements by GISKES and HUNTEMANN at Annexure VI. Neither GISKES or HUNTEMANN can imagine how MIERSMANNS was aware of this incident. (Who is Miersmann?)

Q.12.
Was TONNET indentical with Ter Haak (see P1, Section 3 of this report)?

A.12.
No.

Q.13.
Who was ABOR?

A.13.
ABOR is Arnoldus Albert BAATSEN @ WATERCRESS.

Q.14.
Escape of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE?

A.14.
See statement by GISKES, Annexure VII.

Q15.
Was RIDDERHOF identical with CHERRY BRANDY or George BRANDY?

A.15. RIDDERHOF, when making reports to III-F on George BRANDY was supposed to refer to him as SHERRY.

Q.16.
Radio-Dienst?

A.16.
Neither GISKES or HUNTEMANN have any knowledge of this organisation, nor have they even heard of it.

Q.17.
CS-VI?

A.17.
Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know a great deal about this organisation. However, it is possible that it was penetrated by the Sipo, through LINDEMANS.

Q.18.
Explanation of the German spelling of the key-word "PRIJS" in a/978 from KALE (Beukema toe Water)?

A.18.
EBENEZER (Lauwers) was certainly not being used to encipher, translate or transmit on the 25-4-1943, when the word "PREIS" appeared in message A/978 from KALE via BROCCOLI (Ruseler). At this time EBENEZER was imprisoned at Haaren and the suggested explanation of this incident by HUNTEMANN is as follows:

Members of the Orpo frequently transmitted in the neighbourhood of 's Hertogenbosch, and on these occasions often visited the Haaren prison. It is possible, though unlikely, that one of these men gave to EBENEZER the draft message and asked him to encipher it. EBENEZER may have learned BROCCOLI's key word through tapping on the central heating system and thus have had the chance to insert the word "PREIS" in the message. HUNTEMANN thinks, however, that this would have been very unlikely as, almost always, messages were enciphered at the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, then at Driebergen and taken to the place of transmission already enciphered. In addition, all enciphering and deciphering was subject to a double-check done by two different members of the B-Stelle. Accordingly, no credible explanation for this incident can be offered by HUNTEMANN or GISKERS.

At the same time it is emphasised that all matters connected with ciphers and transmission were dealt entirely by the Orpo and HUNTEMANN and GISKES knew little about the procedure adopted. Neither posesses any technical knowledge of codes, ciphers, etc.

Custody of captured S.O.E. Agents.

In the spring and summer of 1942, all captured agents were taken to the SD prison in Scheveningen. Interrogation generally took place in the prison, but in special cases agents were interrogated personally by SCHREIEDER in the HQ of the Sipo, Binnenhof, The Hague.

EBENEZER (Lauwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan) were detained several weeks in the military prison in Scheveningen as they were being played back and were actually transmitting; it was therefore necessary to prevent them coming into contact with other Dutch prisoners and their Dutch guards.

In about September or October 1942, all NORDPOL agents were taken to the special prison at Haaren. From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received special missions, e.g. Johan GRÜN @ BRUTUS and a female agent named FELIX @ CHICORY (Trix Terwindt), who were first interrogated at Binnenhof by SCHREIEDER.

After the escape from Haaren in December 1943 of PARSNIP (van Rietschoten), CABBAGE (van der Giessen) and LACROSSE (Wegner), all NORDPOL agents, with the exception of EBENEZER (Lauwers), TRUMPET (Jordaan) and FELIX (Terwindt), were transferred early in 1944, to the prison at Assen, and thence at later date, unknown, to camps in Germany (Rawicz and later to Mauthausen).

In mid-September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that TRUMPET (Jordaan) and EBENEZER (Lauwers) had also been sent to Germany, and that they were at Sachsenhausen (Oranienburg) Camp. At the same time, SCHREIEDER professed ignorance of the whereabouts of the other NORDPOL agents. Nevertheless, he promised to make enquiries, but III-F were never informed of the results. As GISKES felt a special responsibility for EBENEZER and TRUMPET as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered HUNTEMANN to visit them at this camp. An account of HUNTEMANN's visit is given at Annexure VIII.

A certain Hptstuf. WACKER was in charge of the prison at Haaren, which was also, at times, used as a detention prison for hostages

Notes on S.O.E. Agents.

It must be emphasised that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SD respnsibility and for this reason both GISKES and HUNTEMANN are not good sources of information on the behaviour and personalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by GISKES or HUNTEMANN.

EBENEZER.
Is described by HUNTEMANN as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to co-operate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made no impression on him and it was impossible to to turn him by threats of this nature. he was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Col. BLUNT (...) had assured him that this would be the case before he left the UK. Special pains were taken to school a B-Stelle operator in EBENEZER's transmitting idiosyncracies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entailed, he would at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans. (It was noticed by his British morse traininers that Lauwers was not the person who was transmitting Ebenezer's messages).

TRUMPET.
Is described as being a man of little inititive and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and HUNTEMAN had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason HUNTEMANN arranged for him to share a cell with EBENEZER.

CATARRH.
Is descibed by GISKES as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promises or threats would induce him to provide information or to co-operate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. Any information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause.

FELIX (Ter WINDT).
A female agent who behaved very well and from whom it was almost immpossible to obtain information. When London proposed an address in The Hague for her to contact, SCHREIEDER promised her liberty if she would consent to act as a SD agent in making the contact. She refused SCHREIEDER's proposal, preferring imprisonment where, however, she was well treated, according to HUNTEMAN.

MARROW.
Is described as a man of high ideals and great patriotism. HUNTEMANN however, considered that his affection for his wife and child (Jambroes) was such that he would never have been a good agent. Whilst under arrest he was constantly asking for news of his family. HUNTEMANN declares that he presuaded SCHREIEDER to send his wife a letter and money through an imaginary Dutch organisation and the wife was allowed to send a letter back through the same intermediary.

WATERCRESS.
Is described by HUNTEMANN as a bad character who voluntarily spied on his fellow prisoners at Haaren and reported on them to the SD. Through him, many written messages from one prisoner to another found their way into the hands of the SD. At a later period he (Baatsen) fell into disfavour with the SD who found papers indicating his intention to escape.

BEETROOT & VAN SITTARD (BEETROOT).
Former members (Parlevliet & van Steen) of the Marechaussee. Described as excellent agents, who at initial interrogation, convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When, in a signal from London at a leter date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were "EUREKA" instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set they captured to Berlin, for expert examination, before they could work it.

PARSLEY.
Described as a good agent from whom the SD could get nothing for a long time. At first interrogation after capture, he insisted that a WT message should be sent to London stating "ELVIRA reached the station 57 minutes late". This message appeared suspicious to GISKES and HUNTEMANN and in order to obviate having to transmit it, PARSLEY (Braggaar) had to be notionally killed.

KALE & CAULIFLOWER.
Described by SCHREIEDER to HUNTEMANN as being good trustworthy men (Beukema toe Water & Mooy) who gave nothing away of any importance.

BROADBEAN.
Volunteered to work for the Germans. His (van Os) offer was refused as HUNTEMANN believed that he only made the offer with a view to future escape.

TURNIP.
Showed (Andringa) considerable resource in warning CARROT (Dessing) (see A.5 if S.O.E. Questionnaire).

SCHREIEDER expressed the opinion that the quality of agents sent, progressively deteriorated.