ANNEXURE VI.
GISKES activities on behalf of EBENEZER and TRUMPET - August 1944.
At the beginning of August 1944, GISKES, through Major KIESEWETTER, who was at that time commanding FAT-365, requested an interview with Brigadeführer NAUMANN, head of the SD and Sipo in Holland. The interview took place at The Hague on August 10th and it was GISKES first meeting with NAUMANN since January 1944, when the Sipo had attempted to hold GISKES responsible for the escape of the five "Nordpol" agents from Haaren. he had apperently asserted that if these men had been shot as spies, the affair would never have been 'blown' to England.
At the interview, KIESEWETTER and a certain Obersturmbahnführer DEPPNER of the Sipo Holland, were also present. The reasons for the meeting were as follows:
a.
For several months past, FAT-365 had not been informed by the Sipo of important investigations which they had conducted in Holland, into the Dutch sabotage and resistance movements. The FAK-307 and FAT-365 had, however, heard about these investigations indirectly.
b.
To arrange if possible, the release of EBENEZER (Louwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan) to FAK-307 and to ensure that the " Nordpol" agents who had been transferred to Germany should continuee to receive the treatment and privileges which had been promised to them by both GISKES and SCHREIEDER.
The interview proved abortive and GISKES could only obtain from NAUMANN the promise that the condition of TRUMPET and EBENEZER would once again be reviewed. NAUMANN the became aggressive, saying: "It should be adequately clear to you that we have no confidence in you. Since the 20th July, we have arrested a good number of Abwehr officers. Do you know that friends of yours were amongst them? I am in agreement with my colleagues in Paris and Brussels, in thinking that you will have to disappear at the earliest opportunity"!
Erich Naumann (29 April 1905 – 7 June 1951) was an SS-Brigadeführer and member of the SD. Naumann had a key role in the Holocaust in Eastern Europe as the commander of Einsatzgruppe VI and the commander of Einsatzgruppe B. A convicted war criminal, Naumann was sentenced to death and hanged on 7 June 1951.
At the interview, KIESEWETTER and a certain Obersturmbahnführer DEPPNER of the Sipo Holland, were also present. The reasons for the meeting were as follows:
a.
For several months past, FAT-365 had not been informed by the Sipo of important investigations which they had conducted in Holland, into the Dutch sabotage and resistance movements. The FAK-307 and FAT-365 had, however, heard about these investigations indirectly.
b.
To arrange if possible, the release of EBENEZER (Louwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan) to FAK-307 and to ensure that the " Nordpol" agents who had been transferred to Germany should continuee to receive the treatment and privileges which had been promised to them by both GISKES and SCHREIEDER.
The interview proved abortive and GISKES could only obtain from NAUMANN the promise that the condition of TRUMPET and EBENEZER would once again be reviewed. NAUMANN the became aggressive, saying: "It should be adequately clear to you that we have no confidence in you. Since the 20th July, we have arrested a good number of Abwehr officers. Do you know that friends of yours were amongst them? I am in agreement with my colleagues in Paris and Brussels, in thinking that you will have to disappear at the earliest opportunity"!
Erich Naumann (29 April 1905 – 7 June 1951) was an SS-Brigadeführer and member of the SD. Naumann had a key role in the Holocaust in Eastern Europe as the commander of Einsatzgruppe VI and the commander of Einsatzgruppe B. A convicted war criminal, Naumann was sentenced to death and hanged on 7 June 1951.
GISKES states that he then terminated the interview. GISKES learned later that NAUMANN's reference to his friends related to Oberst im-General-StabFreiherr Von RÖNNE, Obkdo., des Heeres, Abtag. Fremde Heere-West and Hptm. KLAMROTH, formerly with III-F Copenhagen, both of whom had been arrested and shot after the July Putsch. GISKES was then quite clear in his own mind that his position was extremely delicate and considered that any intervention on his part in favour of EBENEZER and TRUMPET would have no results. However, in September 1944, he sent HUNTEMANN to Holland to see SCHREIEDER and make enquiries about the arrested "Nordpol" agents.
See the Mauthausen bloodbath.
See the Mauthausen bloodbath.
Felix von Rönne.
Hans Georg Klamroth.
Statement by HUNTEMANN in reference to "Nordpol" agents.
During the course of the first few months of the "Nordpol" affair many promises were made to EBENEZER and TRUMPET by the SD at The Hague and inparticular by Krimrat. SCHREIEDER, which, for the most part, were not adhered to.
In addition to the basic promise that they would not be condemned to death, far reaching alleviations were to be made as regards their conditions whilst under arrest. They were to receive better food, londer periods daily in the open air, the time for 'lights out' at night was not to be enforced and many small items which I can no longer recall today. Tabacco and a wireless set were also promised to them.
I always considered myself responsible to some extent for EBENEZER and TRUMPET, even though I had not made these promises to them, which lay in any case I had no authority to make. When I perceived that the SD only kept a few of these promises, I started to take independent action and procured for them regular supplies of tabacco, the purchase of shirts and other types of under-clothing and books for the purpose of study. It was possible in those days to get round the question of obtaining authority from the SD, since EBENEZER and TRUMPET were in the Wehrmacht prison and I thus had the chance of visiting them without applying each time for sD authority to do so. Moreover, at that time, I was not being controlled by the SD. When I observed that both became spiritually depressed after having been imprisoned for some time, I made arrangements for them to be taken out of solitary confinement and placed in a cell together. Afterwards I informed the SD about the alteration which had been made and SCHREIEDER could not then alter what was already a fait accompli.
Once the co-operation of EBENEZER and TRUMPET in the "Nordpol" affair was no longer necessary, the SD ceased bothering about either of them. I visited them whenever I happened to be in Haaren and Procured for them after much opposition, the radio set which for so long had been promised and got the definite impression that the SD would not keep to their promises and would reseined their privileges, if my interest in the two men waned in any way. After FAK-307 went to Brussels I no longer had any opportunity to look after EBENEZER and TRUMPET and I suggested to GISKES that the two men should be brought to Brussels. GISKES agreed and negotiated with SCHEIEDER who turned the matter down, as he was not in a position to release prisoners. Thereupon GISKES explained to the SD that we needed the two men in Belgium, as agents in connection with a similar type of case. The Sd gave their assent to this and I then informed EBENEZER and TRUMPET on one of my next visits, that they would shortl be brought over to Brussels, as I was anxious to get them out of the hands of the SD. Moreover, I said that their release from the SD had been achieved under the pretext theat they were required as agents for FAK-306.
Both stated that under no circimstances would they agree to work against Holland, England or any of their Allies.
I told them that I had never expected that they would do anything of the sort, but I suggested to them that, perhaps there were matters which had a common interest to both parties, i.e. the clearing up of matters connected with Communism (Klärung Kommunisischer Strömungen). Nevertheless, I said, this matter could be talked about later on and the main pre-occupation at the moment was that they should be got away from the Haaren Camp.
(The possibility did exist at that time that they might be used by FAT-364 against an alleged Communist Group, which, however, was not in itself one of the tasks of FAK units. I do not believe, however, that EBENEZER and TRUMPET would have done this work, and for my part, I wanted to get them to Brussels as "Prisoners under protection". More precise details are not remembered).
A few days after I had informed EBENEZEr and TRUMPET about this plan, the invasion commenced and the SD used this as a pretext to reseind their promise that the two men would be released. Evidently Brigfu. NAUMANN would not authorise the assent which had already been given by SCHREIEDER.
The next time I heard about EBENEZER and TRUMPET was in September 1944, when on enquiring what had happened to them, SCHREIEDER told me that they had been sent to the Oranienburg concentration. (See Annexure VIII). As this was done against all the former SD promises, it resulted in my journey, already mentioned, to this place in an attempt to extridate them, but this did not succeed. I only succeeded in speaking to TRUMPET (Jordaan).
SCHREIEDER could not provide me at the time any information whatever about the facts of the remaining "Nordpol" prisoners.
weggum.com
During the course of the first few months of the "Nordpol" affair many promises were made to EBENEZER and TRUMPET by the SD at The Hague and inparticular by Krimrat. SCHREIEDER, which, for the most part, were not adhered to.
In addition to the basic promise that they would not be condemned to death, far reaching alleviations were to be made as regards their conditions whilst under arrest. They were to receive better food, londer periods daily in the open air, the time for 'lights out' at night was not to be enforced and many small items which I can no longer recall today. Tabacco and a wireless set were also promised to them.
I always considered myself responsible to some extent for EBENEZER and TRUMPET, even though I had not made these promises to them, which lay in any case I had no authority to make. When I perceived that the SD only kept a few of these promises, I started to take independent action and procured for them regular supplies of tabacco, the purchase of shirts and other types of under-clothing and books for the purpose of study. It was possible in those days to get round the question of obtaining authority from the SD, since EBENEZER and TRUMPET were in the Wehrmacht prison and I thus had the chance of visiting them without applying each time for sD authority to do so. Moreover, at that time, I was not being controlled by the SD. When I observed that both became spiritually depressed after having been imprisoned for some time, I made arrangements for them to be taken out of solitary confinement and placed in a cell together. Afterwards I informed the SD about the alteration which had been made and SCHREIEDER could not then alter what was already a fait accompli.
Once the co-operation of EBENEZER and TRUMPET in the "Nordpol" affair was no longer necessary, the SD ceased bothering about either of them. I visited them whenever I happened to be in Haaren and Procured for them after much opposition, the radio set which for so long had been promised and got the definite impression that the SD would not keep to their promises and would reseined their privileges, if my interest in the two men waned in any way. After FAK-307 went to Brussels I no longer had any opportunity to look after EBENEZER and TRUMPET and I suggested to GISKES that the two men should be brought to Brussels. GISKES agreed and negotiated with SCHEIEDER who turned the matter down, as he was not in a position to release prisoners. Thereupon GISKES explained to the SD that we needed the two men in Belgium, as agents in connection with a similar type of case. The Sd gave their assent to this and I then informed EBENEZER and TRUMPET on one of my next visits, that they would shortl be brought over to Brussels, as I was anxious to get them out of the hands of the SD. Moreover, I said that their release from the SD had been achieved under the pretext theat they were required as agents for FAK-306.
Both stated that under no circimstances would they agree to work against Holland, England or any of their Allies.
I told them that I had never expected that they would do anything of the sort, but I suggested to them that, perhaps there were matters which had a common interest to both parties, i.e. the clearing up of matters connected with Communism (Klärung Kommunisischer Strömungen). Nevertheless, I said, this matter could be talked about later on and the main pre-occupation at the moment was that they should be got away from the Haaren Camp.
(The possibility did exist at that time that they might be used by FAT-364 against an alleged Communist Group, which, however, was not in itself one of the tasks of FAK units. I do not believe, however, that EBENEZER and TRUMPET would have done this work, and for my part, I wanted to get them to Brussels as "Prisoners under protection". More precise details are not remembered).
A few days after I had informed EBENEZEr and TRUMPET about this plan, the invasion commenced and the SD used this as a pretext to reseind their promise that the two men would be released. Evidently Brigfu. NAUMANN would not authorise the assent which had already been given by SCHREIEDER.
The next time I heard about EBENEZER and TRUMPET was in September 1944, when on enquiring what had happened to them, SCHREIEDER told me that they had been sent to the Oranienburg concentration. (See Annexure VIII). As this was done against all the former SD promises, it resulted in my journey, already mentioned, to this place in an attempt to extridate them, but this did not succeed. I only succeeded in speaking to TRUMPET (Jordaan).
SCHREIEDER could not provide me at the time any information whatever about the facts of the remaining "Nordpol" prisoners.
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