SOE WAR DIARIES JANUARY 1945 PART IC.




DUDLEY
            
  (Jedburgh Liaison with RVV)


Mail Order Dept.

DUDLEY
(Henk Brinkgreve) cabled (63) that he was “Browned off” because local SAS operators got lashing liquor, sweets and cigarettes, while he got nothing at all. Why was this? He also required a decent suit, socks and boots, warm gloves, scarf, hat, shirts, razor blades and soap.

Resistance Strength in Achterhoek

According to the latest available information (
64), there were in the beginning of December about 800 active members of the underground in the Achterhoek. There were arms available for about 400 men.


Christmas Day  Arrest

On January 19th
DUDLEY reported (65) that the commandant of the Achterhoek, COLONEL van BUUREN, with two members of his staff, had been arrested by the Gestapo on Christmas Day. DUDLEY was making efforts to reorganize resistance in that area.

(63)  4 from Evert of 19.1.1945
(64)  3 from Evert of 19.1.1945
(65)  2 from Evert of 19.1.1945




CUBBING         (Contact with Driehoek)


CUBBING (Maarten Cieremans) reported that KAREL (TUNIQUOITS, Gerrit Reisiger) (66) had been arrested during his last transmission. He was now in the hands of the highest officers of the SD at The Hague, who were in possession of half the W/T plan BLYTHE. Up to now KAREL had been well treated, for the SD knew who he was.

(66)  1 from Cubbing of 13.01.45


Cubbing Coming Out

If possible,
CUBBING would come through the lines to give a report (67). He and his operator BOB (Bob Vree) would come through between the rivers Rhine and Waal, near Elst. He asked whether HQ could send for him and his W/T operator and bring them across the Waal. London replied (68) that CUBBING could not be helped on the lines he suggested but, nevertheless, it was hoped that he would be able to leave occupied territory soon.


Stores delayed


CUBBING
cabled (69): “Be reasonable and help us maintain a good W/T contact by doing what I ask you, dropping immediately all special stores, particularly W/T material, accumulators and noiseless charge equipment,  bicycle tires, etc. Do not ask for useless extra skeds”.


W/T plan in German hands

London fully appreciated his W/T contact difficulties
(70) but his plan Wey (Waveney) was most insecure; a copy was in German hands. For this reason London could not comply with his request for extra skeds at the same time. Special sendings were being worked out. London had been trying to send supplies for the last few nights but had been prevented by bad weather. They would keep on trying.


Agents betrayed by “key clicks”

CUBBING
reported (71) that difficulties had been experienced owing to the “key clicks” of their W/T sets. KAREL had transmitted about fifteen times over a period of three weeks at a point approximately 400 metres from a Luftwaffe office. The Germans had accidently heard his key clicks and walked through Zeist with miniature direction finders. After three days walking they found his street. KAREL was not aware of this and carried on with his work. Suddenly a small local razzia was made and KAREL was arrested.  CRIBBAGE was pick up in the same way. BOB had transmitted for three days from one address and again the Germans had nearly succeeded in finding him by following his key clicks with a broadcast receiver in a motor car. Fortunately BOB had been on the
alert and avoided arrest.

Key clicks can be heard all over the radio band, so one doesn’t have to tune on the frequency on which the station is transmitting to hear the clicks. Don’t know if this problem only occurred with the B2 wireless set.


Better sets needed

The “click filter” of the B mark II set was most inefficient and if HQ could not send sets with a better filter then
CUBBING and his fellow workers would soon follow KAREL (Gerrit Reisiger) and CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn). As a temporary emergency measure BOB was working at Loosdrecht,  while CUBBING stayed in Utrecht, which he could not leave because of his work. On the other hand, the journey between Utrecht and Loosdrecht cost time and was dangerous. Would London please do what it could to help?


Safe Addresses Rare

In reply  London suggested
(72) that he should cut his traffic to a minimum. His operator should never transmit from the same place twice. CUBBING pointed out (73) that safe addresses for transmissions were getting very rare, so that if BOB never transmitted from the same address twice their work come to a standstill. He hoped London would eliminate the “key click danger”.

(67)  2 from Cubbing of 13.01.45
(68)  32 to Cubbing of 19.01.45
(69)  6 from Cubbing of 20.01.45
(70)  35 to Cubbing of 20.01.45
(71)  10 from Cubbing of 24.01.45
(72)  39 to Cubbing of 25.01.45
(73)  13 from Cubbing of 26.01.45


COURSING


COURSING (Hoogewerff) asked for more money (74). Food conditions were very bad and steadily worsening.

Arms in Milk Cart
Referring to the loss of the central weapon magazine
COURSING reported (75) that one of the arrested men had “talked” to the SD straight away. The magazine had been surrounded by 50 Grünepolizei and everything had been completely lost. Weapon transport in Rotterdam was now possible only on a very small scale. A boat and a milk cart previously used for such transport were now known to the SD, who were trying to blow up the explosives in the boat.


Rummy delayed by snow

COURSING
(Hoogewerff) reported (76) that experiments with one-man torpedoes were being carried out at Hellevoetsluis and Lekhaven, COURSING reported (77) that RUMMY’s departure had been delayed by snow, but he would start off as soon as possible.

(76)  Srl No. B2580 from Coursing of 27.01.45
(77)  29 from Coursing of 31.01.45




NECKING & BOBSLEIGH                                                                                             (Resistance in Friesland)

Reception Conditions “Lousy”

NECKING
(Peter Tazelaar) reported (78) that general conditions for reception committees were “most lousy”. Recent failures were due to bad lighting. Could London please send more batteries? He would go to the ground himself for the next operation (79). London appreciated his enthusiasm (80) but considered he should abstain from being present at dropping operations.


Floods Change View of Friesland

He cabled (
81) that RAF pilots should be warned that the air  view of Friesland was completely changed because of the high water level.


Positions in Drenthe and Groningen

He reported (
82) that although at the present time there was no commandant in Drenthe, resistance there was organized, but owing to German patrol activity this province had to be supplied by operations to Friesland. The same situation existed in Groningen, but it was hoped that receptions there would be organized in due course.

Reception Committees Indisciplined

With regard to the question of personal attendance at reception grounds (
83) he stated that this was necessary owing to the recent run of failures. The reception committees were inclined to be rather undisciplined and it was no good telling them from a distance what to do. They were also getting discouraged.


Need for Personal Attendance

Under his personal direction it had “worked out wonderfully” at the last dropping operation. However, if London insisted he would do as they wished, but in that case he would take no responsibility for the outcome of the operations.


London to Report on Committees
London suggested (
84) that after he had once demonstrated the reception procedure the committee should be left to carry on. He should advise them that if the correct procedure were not observed  nothing would be sent. London would then keep NECKING advised on the efficiency of his various committees. NECKING reported (85) that runways had been repaired on the Leeuwarden aerodrome. Anti- Aircraft guns also been put in order and a supply of light bombs for fighters had arrived.


Too Many Cooks

London cabled (
86): “Have just received following message from the OD at Assen: ‘Friesland asks that nine instructors should be dropped on the ground Sideboard’. Do you know anything about this, as all resistance matters come through you”. NECKING replied (87): “Do not take notice of anything which does not come from NBS Friesland through us. Shall look into the matter. Some fool acted on his own silly initiative. One of our little domestic troubles. Will not happen again.


Dangers of Moving

NECKING
  (Peter Tazelaar) reported (88) that the NBS was established in Drenthe. Any agent being sent to the area should have two W/T operators who could work alternately, so that he would not need to move them too often. “Moving between two addresses is the most dangerous thing in this racket”.


Reorganisation in Drenthe

He cabled (
89) that after the recent trouble the Drenthe area had started to work again on an NBS basis, completely outside the former constellation of KP and OD. They had had to begin again from scratch because all theit leaders and arms were seized. They were now ready to start re-arming. The commandant’s opinion was that they would be able to receive on their own grounds. They were waiting only for easy contact with England.


Necking to Stay in Friesland
He asked (
90) whether London  could send men to Drenthe soon. If not, he suggested that as communications were too poor to run Drenthe from Friesland, and since Friesland was running smoothly, he should leave BOBSLEIGH (Faber) to run Friesland, and go to Drenthe himself with one set and a W/T operator. London replied (91) that a W/T operator and organizer for Drenthe would be dropped as soon as the ground to which they were going had been
successfully tried out.
NECKING should stay where he was.


V-2’s from Overijssel

He cabled (
92) that he had received information from an absolutely reliable source that V-2’s were being fired from Nieuwheeten in the Overijssel. The direction of the firing was south and south-west. London cabled (93) that they had been warned that arrests were still going on in Drenthe. It was suggested that he should be very careful and not make personal contacts.

(78)  13 from Necking of 1.1.1945
(79)  14 from Necking of 2.1.1945
(80)  38 to Necking of 3.1.1945
(81)  15 from Necking of 3.1.1945
(82)  15 from Necking of 4.1.1945
(83)  16 from Necking of 5.1.1945
(84)  39 to Necking of 5.1.1945
(85)  17 from Necking of 6.1.1945
(86)  42 to Necking of 8.1.1945
(87)  19 from Necking of 9.1.1945
(88)  24 from Necking of 19.1.1945
(89)  27 from Necking of 22.1.1945
(90)  28 from Necking of 22.1.1945
(91)  49 to Necking of 22.1.1945
(92)  31 from Necking of 23.1.1945
(93)  53 to Necking of 27.1.1945





TRAPPING            (Second W/T to Rotterdam KP)


TRAPPING’s (Richard Barme) cables for this month were concerned solely with the technicalities of transmission.




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