BUREAU INLICHTINGEN
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX                                                   LONDON, W.1.  
16 November, 1944.
            B.I.                                                                                       Upper Feilde House
(Netherlands xxxxxxxxx Int. Dept.                                                         71 Park Street
           (I.D)                                                                                  Tel: Mayfair 5016/5017

No. Bi.  GU.  8457/44.                                     TOP SECRET

Betreft:                                                         MEMORANDUM


To:   Major Dobson.
From: Captain Fock.

Subject: Bombardment Sluices, Den Oever.


In connection with your request regarding the above, the following represents the view of competent Dutch Authorities:

1.
It is impossible to ascertain the period which will elapse before flooding would take place after the sluices would have been put out of order by enemy action. (in closed position)
This depends on the amount of water which the Yssel carries into the Ysselmeer, which again depends on the rain and snow fall in Switzerland, Germany and Holland.
Further, the level of the Ysselmeer depends on the flow of water from the Yssel through the Noord Zee Kanaal which in its turn depends on the condition of the sluices in the latter canal.
As far as it is known, the condition of these sluices is such that great anxiety is felt as to the feasibility of sluicing through the North Sea Canal.


2.
If the sluices at Den Oever are out of order in opened position, by Allied action, serious difficulties may also be experienced.
In the first place, the uncontrolable flow through the sluices might result in the sourcing out of the Ysselmeer, which might lead to sagging of the sluices.
In the second place, if the sluices are permanently opened, strong Western and North Western winds might stow the water into the Ysselmeer, this resulting in the water level being increased to such an extent that the "polders" would be seriously endangered. This would specially apply to the North East Polder.


3.
Under the circumstances it is considered that the best would be to prevent the enemy to interfere with the sluices in question.
Should this prove to be impossible, and should the enemy put the sluices out of order in closed position, it is felt that for the time being no action would be required, until the result of the enemy action becomes more apparent.

In any case it is considered that no Allied bombing should take place in view to prevent the enemy of putting the sluices out of action when closed, as in that case the dangers mentioned sus 2 would occur.

Allied bombing, aiming to open the sluices permanently should only take place after the enemy has acted and the water level becomes dangerously high.



                                                                                                   C.L.W. Fock
                                                                                                    (Captain)