HS9/1413/2
                                                    REPORT - PIETER DEKKER                            April 44 - May 45.


                                                             
DRAUGHTS II

GENERAL.

Beginning of April 1944 your agent HANS asked me to assist him in the building up of a technical apparatus for the purpose of maintaining communication between the Dutch Government and the Illegal Press in Holland.

As I was a member of the editorial staff of the paper "Je Maintiendrai" I was in a position to put HANS in contact with the Press and, if necessary, with other illegal organisations.

For some time the Illegal Press, which was gradually expanding, and dealing with politics rather than resistance activities, (Het Parool, Je Maintiendrai, Trouw, Vrij Nederland, De Waarheid dealt strictly with resistance matters) had felt the need to come to a mutual agreement , whereby resistance would be stressed and to lay down certain rules which would be carried out by a temporary Government and other problems which might present itself during the transition period and afterwards. For this purpose several illegal groups were formed such as Het Vaderlandsche Committee, the Contact Commission, The Groote Adviesraad. The Press would be represented in these groups. It is not my intention to give you all the details on this in this report.

As a result of the above mentioned the "Press-contact" was established, in which the most important papers were represented. The "Press-courier" would maintain contact with the press via a member of the editorial staff of "Je Maintiendrai". It was through this member, Jo WÜTHERICH, Utrecht that the press had at its disposal the cliches with a message from H.M. the Queen, a few of which were printed in Holland, also the amount of Hfl. 50.000 which HANS brought for dividing amongst the illegal papers. Via this contact person the Press was also informed that in future they would receive from the other side papers required, such as newspapers, periodicals and books; first of all the papers brought by HANS would be distributed. Unfortunately this promise did not materialise, as the material sent could not be received.

After this the complete "Press-contact" disintegrated as there was no possibility of communicating with HANS instructors. The search for transmitters was of no avail, so that HANS decided to return to collect new material. He appointed me as his successor during his absence, under the name of Pieter DEKKER, introduced me to the operator FRANS, instructed me to contact you as soon as possible, to look into the plan "BONSO" and to organise a reception committee ground as soon as possible to which HANS could return the same moon period.

Some days after HANS departure, a friend of mine Mr. HOLLA at VUGHT, who I had introduced to HANS, with a view to finding a route to the South, contacted the operator of the group ST. JUDE (
Herman Leus) who appeared to be in the possession of a transmitter, but he had lost his crystals on landing. As FRANS did have some crystals it was decided to work together until one of us would receive new material.

Jan van GREVENSTEIN at VOORBURG was my assistent. Whilst I remained in the background, van G. organised the ground and reception Committee at HEEZE. He also looked for transmission addresses, so that we would be ready when transmitters were sent. Dr. E van DOORN, doctor at THE HAGUE was very helpful in this respect.

In connection with the plan BONSO it seemed advisable to me to have a discussion with the editors of "Het Vaderland", a newspaper which was printed here and was sent to Germany by Rhine Aken (Boats), on the possibilities connected with this plan. After investigation, I found out that this paper was very well constructed, but that the difficulties with which they had to cope prevented the paper from being distributed amongst the Dutch workers in Germany. The object of the plan BONZO could be carried out most effciently by distribution of papers. With this in view I gave "Het Vaderland" financial aid and also assisted them in the exploring of possibilities to intensify the distribution. I also thought of the forming of cells amongst the workers in different German camps to keep up their morale with all possible means. To organise this agents had to be sent to Germany. For this purpose we went to the NV Philips, as we knew this factory was still sending representatives to Germany. I instructed van G. to organise this and he contacten Mr. ZWARTENDIJK and Mr. NORT of the Philips factory. A Philips courier could leave for Germany in August. However, we lost contact with him when Brabant was liberated, with the result that the activities in connection with this project could not be continued along these lines.

The Press repeatedly asked for the foreign newspapers, which were promised, but unfortunately they had to be disappointed . This trend of affair resulted in very little confidence being placed in the Press-Contact.

At the end of June our contact with England was broken. ST.JUDE has to work in another part of the country, it was therefore no longer possible for FRANS to use his transmitter. FRANS had informed London the ground was ready and we expected a load during this period. This never came and the only thing to do was to wait patiently.

One of the members of the reception committee told me the other side didn't trust us. A friend of his, OTTO van B.I. (Bureau Inlichtingen) had heard this in EINDHOVEN, the SD had penetrated our organisation with the result that contact was to be broken with the group of the HEEZERHEIDE. This man insisted the story was true, which seemed strange to me, as our group was very limited and penetration on those lines would have been found out immediately.


JOS GEMMEKE - in charge of distribution of "Je Maintiendrai" in 7 provinces - received a photograph of H.M. the QUEEN from Didi GAAZENBEEK at EDE, in charge of distribution of "Je Maintiendrai" in the province of Gelderland (later on TINE at ROTTERDAM). Didi had received this photograph from a friend with the request to have it printed in the illegal press. It was easy to guess who the person was, who had given the photo to Didi, so that Jos asked Didi to speak to the man in question. Beginning of August we got the opportunity to inform London via this man (Bert) {Bert de Goede @ RUMMY} that everything was all right. The photo was passed on to the Press and printed in some papers (amongst other "Ons Volk").

In the middle of August, JOSEPHINE and GUUS arrived with the long awaited materials. (For further particulars see their report). At last we could start work! Unfortunately Jan van GREVENSTEIN was arrested a few days later and practically at the same time some members on the editorial Staff of "Je Maintiendrai" including Jo WÜRTERLICH were imprisoned. It was too late when I was informed about the later arrest.

To ensure the efficient distribution of material, a list had been made of the goods which were meant for the Press, so that these could be distributed as soon as possible (The photograph of H.M. the Queen was thrown away en route as new agents were 'overtrained' in security and consequently too security minded. Taking their circumstances into account this was visible). Meanwhile I had informed Jo WÜTERICH that a load had arrived . At his request I sent a courier, Theo SMEULDERS, to UTRECHT with a vague list of contents. He did not return and later it appeared he had been arrested at WÜRTERICH correspondence address. We went underground for a few days. WÜTERICH was murdered with his colleague in the vicinity of St. Bavokerk at HAARLEM as a result of German reprisals. Theo SMEULDERS was freed on 23 Sep when under the pressure of the Allied advance the Germans decided to abolish the prison camps , VAN GREVENSTEIN was freed the beginning of September.

The Allied advance had caused great confusion amongst the Germans, but also amongst the Dutch people. The liberation seemed very close at hand in those days and consequently resistance activities were reduced. Also our task seemed to have come to an end at the beginning of September.

Now that at last the technical apparatus functioned after approximately 6 months, the press apparatus no longer operated and the enthusiasm felt when GUUS and JOSEPHINE arrived had died down. Meanwhile a number of films had been made of published illegal papers, which were being held up for transport to London. However, it was difficult to send a courier (my 23 and 28), because of the break-through of the Allied armies, so I decided to wait for the pigeons which were to be sent. In my No. 22, I informed you that TULIP ground was still OK, in reply London asked for a new ground. When this had been found and approved, we hoped we would have more success with a dropping this time. However, it was not to be, It was too late and the opportunity was gone.

After being an agent for 5 months, it seemed very little had been achieved. We ourselves wanted to make "good", but there were endless difficulties and it was impossible for the "press contact" to function.

The situation in the West was still uncertain after the September days. We lost our area through the liberation of the South; the railway strike prevented communication with other parts of the country. We searched for a new ground in 't Gooi, but London advised against this.

It amazed me when an agent landed with a package for the Press (my No. 39). As a result the prestige of the press courier did not rise. It would have been more tactful to have handed this to the press via the official agent. A case like this is rather confusing for the press.

As already mentioned the illegal, life came to a stand-still through the course of events. Also the activities of the press were very restricted. Through the extremely slow internal communications, it was decided the end of September that with the cooperation of all the newspapers Oranje bulletins would be given out. In which would be given all the Government bulletins, notes for the population and the main headlines of the news. These bulletins were given out locally and distributed regionally as much as possible.

After September the Press commenced publication again; the chief editors of the large papers settled in Amsterdam.

HANS (
Biallosterski)was sent with a special mission and when I visited him he put me in touch with the CNBS (Koot), as they had plans to stimulate the "paper resistance". The CNBS considered it important for me to move to Amsterdam with my staff, as all the resistance nucleus were there. For this reason it did not seem desirable to me. We agreed though that I would send a representative with carte blanche. Shortly afterwards I sent VAN GREVENSTEIN to Amsterdam in that capacity.

My contact with the press was broken when Jo WÜRTERICH was taken and other events which occurred in September. JOS GEMMEKE, who became my closest assistance after losing Van GREVENSTEIN, took charge of the "sending Guus" (
material that that GUUS took with him) which was to be handed to the press.

Now that VAN GREVENSTEIN was going to Amsterdam, it was again possible to contact the press. The original object of his mission, about which I asked you for instructions (my No.109) was not approved of by the members of the NBS staff, after further consultation. However, he was introduced to the re-established press contact by the representative of the NBS. The papers received him with a certain amount of suspicion. It appeared only a few weeks before the capitulation that they had imagined a press courier to be something entirely different.


I shall now go into this water. What could VAN GREVENSTEIN offer the press?

Often he was asked this question; he consulted me. This sometimes annoyed me and I made the remark, after all I am only a postman and when I have no mail, I cannot deliver anything.

I received via HANS some folders with cliches, Vliegende Hollander and Times Weekly. I further received Hfl. 47.500 for the press. Later it appeared that a number of papers requested from the South were distributed amongst the population of North Holland, originally these were meant for the press. HANS was not to blame for this, because the package containing the newspapers had been lying in the water and was retrieved by members of a reception committee team, who found these very interesting and decided to distribute them. Meanwhile VAN GREVENSTEIN kept the press quiet with many promises, which could never materialise. I then decided to ask for another ground to get things running smoothly. Six weeks passed before I knew when I would receive the material meant for me. Also for this HANS was not to blame, the reason being the slow transport system.

The press became impatient and justly so. What was the use of a communication agent, when requests were not complied with and when there was no indication that the illegal press was getting either attention in London or in Eindhoven. Was this being done intentionally and did they want to ignore the way in which the press was contributing to stiffening population in regard to resistance and calling on everybody to make a start on post-war problems.

The press nucleus was indignant and instructed the C.I.D. to investigate, see appendices. Reading a letter from Mr. VERDUYN, which is enclosed, it is easy to draw conclusions with regard to the atmosphere.

After receiving this letter I had an interview with MR. VERDUYN (Ir. van DAM, CID), who explained the objections of the press. I pointed out the difficulties to MR. VERDUYN which had existed since the institution "press courier" had been established and put some of the matters right he had mentioned in his letter.

The main objection of the press appeared to be that they had no representative in the institution "press courier", who would be in a position to assist the Government with with publication of articles, for example on political matters.

I completely understood their point of view. In my report I only mentioned the expansion of the press during the years of occupation. Unfortunately these objections were only mentioned 3 weeks before the capitulation and it was then too late to change the policy.

Finally it seems desirable to me to ask some questions, which I discussed with MR. VERDUYN: why was there no reaction either in London or Eindhoven (Regeerings Voorlichtingsdienst) with regard to the publications in the press in occupied Holland after September? Why did we receive the impression that the press was regarded as an unimportant factor after September 1944? Why was the press not provided regularly with foreign and liberated Dutch publications?



HAAKMAN.

J. VAN GREVENSTEIN was discharged from the prison at Scheveningen through the intervention of V-Mann J. HAAKMAN of The Hague and later Sassenheim. The person, who arranged this was a MR. ZWOLSMAN and VAN GREVENSTEIN were impressed by the "generous" attitude of HAAKMAN. Van Grevenstein asked me if it wasn't possible to save HAAKMAN when the Allies took over. Although this made me shudder, I decided to have a talk with HAAKMAN in the presence of ZWOLSMAN and Van Grevenstein. Although I was convinced that HAAKMAN did not expect any mercy from me, I told him I would do what I could in view of the fact he had saved the life of my best friend. As cunning and crafty HAAKMAN usually is, he was as naïve during our discussions. I asked him to hand me a list of the persons he had managed to keep out of prison. According to him this was a considerable number. I further pointed out to him that if he desired my cooperation, he must cease his collaboration with the SD immediately and only concern himself with the freeing of prisoners. he told me he would do this as everyone knew the liberation was only a question of days (it was then the 8th September). ZWOLSMAN would act as intermediary between HAAKMAN and I, which I considered necessary for security reasons.

When the anxious days were over for HAAKMAN and it looked as though we would not be liberated for the moment, he became more imprudent. In his opinion he did nothing but good, but we knew better and let him go his own way. ZWOLSMAN spent all his time and money to get HAAKMAN to free prisoners. Actually HAAKMAN was often successful. He then collected cigars, cigarettes, drink, hams, cheese, etc. His materialistic outlook was exploited in order to spur him on to greater activity. This worked like a miracle. To my question what his actual position was with the SD during our first meeting, he gave me a long but evasive reply. Later we understood from the remarks he made and the way he used his influence, he had done important work for the SD and was still doing so. ZWOLSMAN was useful because HAAKMAN was completely under his influence. HAAKMAN would done anything for ZWOLSMAN and ZWOLSMAN encouraged their friendship.

ZWOLSMAN managed to extract a Bescheinigung for a lorry and two big salon cars from HAAKSMAN for the Military Police traffic group at The Hague, as well as a similar Bescheinigung for a car for himself.

With this transport it was possible for us to move transmitters and other material locally without interference.

ZWOLSMAN managed to get in touch with Kriminal Kommissar FRANK and supplied is through this contact with important information. It was FRANK and MUNDT who arranged for a meeting between the underground and the SD. This invitation was accepted by the underground via HAAKMAN and ZWOLSMAN (Your No.88, my No. 190).

I met HAAKMAN during January for the second time. He asked me whether he was satisfied with his work. By showing him "phony" telegrams (with your approval) it was possible for me to convince him that "the other side" appreciated his good work and that he was regarded as one of us.

meanwhile it had been proved that he was responsible for many important arrests. It goes without saying that he did not tell ZWOLSMAN about this; we in turn acted as if we knew nothing about what was going on.

When in February FRANS was arrested I knew definitely that HAAKMAN would do everything possible to liberate him. The FRANS case looked hopeless, the fact that he was caught with an American weapon in his possession meant the death penalty for FRANS (See report Frans).

I met HAAKMAN for the third time and explained the matter in no uncertain terms, saying it would have serious consequences for him if FRANS was nor directly liberated. Now the contact with London was broken with the result I could not send telegrams regarding his special status at the critical moment. HAAKMAN admitted that he saw no change of freeing FRANS by his personal intervention. After giving the matter some thought he found a solution by approaching his personal friend HINKFUSS, leader of the Abteilung Abwehr of the SD. He would tell HINKFUSS that FRANS was one of his co-workers, who was looking for a route to the South. For this reason FRANS carried a weapon to defend himself, should he be caught by terrorist. However, FRANS had not realised it was necessary to apply for a "Waffenschein".

Should this plan be successful, I, in turn would give him details about a route to the South, which I agreed to do. My plans, however, went further than that; via HAAKMAN HINKFUSS would inform me for passing on to London when couriers would leave for the South. If this worked it would be possible to catch these people in Brabant, treat them as innocents and have them shadowed with a view to investigate the "Abwehr" in Brabant.

My telegrams regarding this matter were received mutilated as they were wrongly encoded (245, 46 & 47). I found this out later when I discussed this matter with SPHINX. At least it surprised me, when I received your No. 133, containing a refusal. Later FRANS was actually freed by HAAKMAN via HINKFUSS. Details regarding a route to the South were not supplied.

HAAKMAN gave us important information regarding HANS. We were kept information about his condition. Only later did HAAKMAN find out about his death. FRANK had kept this secret because of security reasons. As soon as he knew, he told me. In turn, I passed it on to REERINK (
Henk Veeneklaas).

During the last months we received much proof, which confirmed our suspicions about HAAKMAN, especially by censoring his correspondence. This was done by a Marechaussee of the afore-mentioned Traffic Group, whom ZWOLSMAN had appointed as body guard to HAAKMAN and who made out detailed reports regarding HAAKMAN's movements.

HAAKMAN has now been arrested. He was one of our important tools. Such persons ca be of great use, if handled rightly.


BONZO.

London asked for a contact address in Germany in your No. 65, to which agents could be sent. I could not assist in this matter as circumstances had changed and there was no contact with Germany. I mentioned it in my No. 123 (see mention of this earlier on in my report).

In your No.91 the subject was brought up again. Together with Dr. VAN DOORN I went to see Mr. KIEWIET DE JONG regarding the possibilities of building up an organisation in Germany for the Dutch workers. This man, having influential German connections, visualised a rapid expansion, taking into account the fact the war would last until the autumn. He thought he might succeed via Mr. BERTRAM, one of the directors of the Hamburg-America Line, which would enable him to place reliable persons in the agencies of this company. It was possible for him to arrange a business trip to Germany as a member of the Board of Directors of the Shipping Co. Wilhelm Müller and under this disguise to take stock of the situation. We obtained a permit for him via HAAKMAN. We decided to get a car ready for this trip as train connections were very slow and sometimes did not function at all. When you appointed SPHINX and an operator to organise this matter, it was decided to send them along with Mr. KIEWIET DE JONG: SPHINX (
Jos Gemmeke) as his secretary, the operator as his chauffeur.

We asked for further instructions in my No, 218 and No. 219. KIEWIET DE JONG wished to have a clear picture what exactly the mission consisted of. He wanted to cross the lines to discuss the matter personally with the people concerned. Your reply No. 102 indicated that this pan was a continuation of the plan BONZO. Furthermore our question was replied to by another question. The detailed instructions we requested, we never received. KIEWIET DE JONG went to make enquiries and approached several people to find out the location of camps and when contact last made. These enquiries produced little result. So we awaited the instructions SPHINX would bring. Also her instructions were very vague (for further information see Sphinx report).

My opinion is that the BONZO plan was started too late in the war to achieve success. It would have been better if, when the deportations started, agents had been trained here, who could have been sent to Germany as volunteers. It seems desirable to me if in future such plans are worked out in detail and to add them to the secret instructions of the General Staff, in order to be ready should these circumstances arise again in war-time.



INFORMATION.

We received information from different sources; persons who returned from Germany, from industrialised, independent persons, groups which did not have contact with London and finally the information service of Region 13 NBS; whose leader I knew and whose achievements I would like to mention separately.

I appointed Berend DE GROOT at Voorburg to operate this branch independently, who I had met during the BONZO affair (technical leader of Het Vaderland).

Ir. O DEN HOLLANDER at Wassenaar supplied us with important information regarding rockets. He maintained contact for us with the personnel of the Technical High School (
T.U.) at Delft, which was making a study of the rockets and attempting to find an anti-weapon, however without results.

We received general information from the so-called G.G.B. Also members of this group deserve much praise for their co-operation during the past months.



PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK.

The printing and photographing of press products and other papers was done by jan KIMMAN at Wassenaar, who was in general service.



Press and other consignments to the South.

The courier routes to London were a problem to me. The quickest method to deliver press products? The quickest method seemed always to me to send the mail by pigeon. I have never been able to send it that way, as there were no pigeons at my disposal. Added to which I was told by others that seldom a pigeon arrived. Once I gave someone press products, who ran a route to Switzerland. It was my intention though to establish our own courier route. However, I was unsuccessful.

When the South was liberated I regularly sent people through the lines (Nort, Jos & Jonker) or gave films to those going through the lines. Seen annexes.



HANS successor. February 1945.

I will deal very briefly with this matter. REERINK (
Veeneklaas) has probably given you all the details. Whenever necessary, I had contact with HANS (Biallosterski). At the request of HANS co-workers (Karels), who informed me of HANS arrest, I went to Amsterdam. KARELS told me a complicated story, from which it appeared that he was HANS advisor and right-hand man. According to him he went to his house every day and was even allowed to go through the telegrams. As I was not fully conversant with the methode of HANS regarding his work nor of the construction of his organisation, I got the impression that KARELS story was true. One thing which struck was the fact that he criticised the work of REERINK and made him seem an unimportant factor. I knew REERINK personally and was convinced he was the most important man next to HANS. Unfortunately, my visit to Amsterdam had to be short. My attempt to contact REERINK was in vain. After my return to The Hague KARELS phoned me and told me, that if order was to be maintained in the organisation of HANS, a successor should be appointed at once. Although GUUS (Frank Hamilton) had many failings he was the man who would have to be in charge for the time being. As there was no other choice, I suggested having GUUS appointed as leader.

During my second visit to Amsterdam I met REERINK. He explained to me exactly what KARELS did. My suspicions regarding KARELS as well as REERINK were confirmed. I regretted having nominated GUUS. REERINK has probably mentioned in his report the further course of events.



Weapons and medical supplies.

I shall give full details re the above as soon as possible in a supplementary report.




w.mugge@home.nl


    
17-11-2019